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III. RIGHTS IN COLLISION: THE INDIVIDUAL




The focus of this article is different from the two which precede
it. It is not a full exposition of a single guarantee, but takes the form
of a dialectic exposition on the inherent tension between the indi-
vidual right of privacy' and the public right to know.' Each right is
examined independently in terms of its convention history in Mon-
tana, and its implementation in Montana by the courts or legisla-
ture. The development of each right in states which have accorded
it explicit constitutional status is mentioned where illustrative, and
for each right a course of further development in Montana is sug-
gested. The article then comes to its focus, the judicial weighing of
the two rights where they collide. For the purposes of this part of
the discussion, the article will examine the experience of other state
supreme courts in dealing with privacy challenges to public official
financial disclosure laws. Finally, there are some suggestions about
how the problem, should it arise in Montana, may be resolved.
B. The Right of Privacy
Article II, section 10 of the Montana Constitution provides:
The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a
free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest.
Among the rights given explicit constitutional status in the
Montana Constitution's Bill of Rights, the right of privacy, like the
right to a clean and healthful environment and the right of equality
among the sexes, has been generated by the pressures of our ad-
vanced technological society. It is interesting to note that the need
for individual privacy was not questioned by the delegates to the
Montana Constitutional Convention, while the need seems never to
have occurred to the drafters of the federal constitution. Montana
is not alone among the states in amending its constitution to reflect
the growing public concern for the preservation of the right of pri-
vacy.
This portion of the article will examine the deliberations of the
Constitutional Convention regarding the right, the recognition and
1. The Constitution of the State of Montana (1972) [hereinafter MONT. CONST.], art.
I, § 10.
2. MONT. CONST., art. II, § 9.
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development of the right by the decisions of the Montana supreme
court, the weight and scope accorded to the right by the supreme
courts of those other states with explicit constitutional rights of
privacy, and will conclude with some suggestions for further action
by the practitioners and courts to bring the right to full flower in
Montana.
1. The Constitutional Convention
The proceedings of the Constitutional Convention leave no
doubt that it was the consensus of the delegates that the right of
privacy deserved explicit recognition. A preliminary study3 and the
Bill of Rights Committee comments' to the proposed provision ac-
knowledge the judicial recognition of the right of privacy.5 The ex-
planation of the Committee for elevating the right to explicit consti-
tutional status leans heavily on the dangers imposed by our
information-oriented technological society.'
Unfortunately, the cases cited by the Committee and the rea-
soning of the Committee in its explanation have no common factual
ground. They are from the scattered fields of family planning,
search and seizure law, and data gathering and processing. Clearly
the Committee did not intend to define the scope of the right of
privacy by such diverse citations, and the delegates did not discuss
the scope of the right on the convention floor. Rather, the Commit-
tee must have intended them to be illustrative of the spectrum of
areas in which there may be a legitimate expectation of privacy.
Evidence of the concern of the delegates as a whole for the scope of
the right of privacy may be found in the action of the convention
on the proposed search and seizure provision 7 The reference to
"invasions of privacy" was deleted on the convention floor when it
was suggested that the right of privacy was being diluted for warrant
purposes,8 and that a deletion would absolutely preclude intercep-
tion of communications Definition of the scope of the right was, by
3. Applegate, Constitutional Convention Study No. 10, Bill of Rights (1972).
4. Montana qonstitutional Convention Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, Comment
-Right of Privacy [hereinafter Committee Comment] (1972).
5. Id., citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); State v. Brecht, 157 Mont.
264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971); and Welsh v. Roehm, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952).
6. Committee Comment at 24.
7. The original Bill of Rights Committee Proposal for MoNT. CONST., art. In, § 11 read:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures and invasions of privacy. No warrant to search any
place, or seize any person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be
searched or the person or thing to be seized, or without probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation reduced to writing. (emphasis added).
8. Transcript of the Proceedings of the Montana Constitutional Convention (1972)
[hereinafter Proceedings], 5203.
9. Proceedings a+ 5204.
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default, left to the courts with the implicit direction to extend rather
than retract the right as our society grows more complex and de-
manding.
The scope of the right of privacy may have been left undefined,
but the convention gave the courts clear directions as to the weight
to be accorded the right to privacy. The intent of the Bill of Rights
Committee was clear: "The Committee believes that the Constitu-
tion should specify that the only circumstances in which the right
of privacy may be infringed is following the showing of a compelling
state interest." 10 However, upon motion, the "without a showing of
a compelling state interest" was struck from the provision without
significant opposition."
When the amended provision was reported out of the Style and
Drafting Committee the delegate who had offered the deleting
amendment moved for reconsideration, supporting his motion by
saying that his general intent, to strengthen the protection of the
individual, was not served by his amendment.2 The debate on the
motion to reconsider (which passed) and the subsequent motion to
reintroduce the "compelling state interest" test was lively. Various
delegates took the positions that the standard was implicit, 3 that
the right of privacy had been rendered absolute," that the amended
provision was meaningless to a court, 5 and that in default of any
explicit standard the courts could choose to apply a mere
"reasonableness" test to defeat privacy rights." It was this last argu-
ment which apparently swayed the convention as a whole, and the
"compelling state interest" test was restored.
This explicit statement of the weight to be accorded to the right
guaranteed by the provision places a heavy burden on the state. It
has even been suggested that the task faced by the state of showing
a compelling interest is, in most situations, an impossible one.
Clearly the delegates placed a very high value on the right of pri-
vacy, and they forcefully indicated that the courts were to accord it
every protection available under this most stringent standard of
judicial review.
10. Committee Comment at 24.
11. Proceedings at 5183-85.
12. Proceedings at 5715.
13. Proceedings at 5714.
14. Proceedings at 5711-12.
15. Proceedings at 5715.
16. Proceedings at 5712-13.
17. Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 645 (1975);.
Gunther, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1087 (1969).
1978]
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2. Privacy and the Montana Supreme Court
As noted by the Bill of Rights Committee, historically the de-
velopment of the right of privacy has been carried out by the courts.
The Montana supreme court has found a right of privacy to exist in
Montana, but has gone little further delineating the scope which the
right will be given. In essence the court has carried the right no
further than it had before the right was raised to explicit constitu-
tional status.
In State v. Coburn,8 the first case discussing privacy after the
passage of the Constitution in 1972, the court certainly mentions
that Montana has a constitutional right of privacy independent of
the federal right,'9 but does nothing more. The decision is simply a
reaffirmance of the decision in State v. Brecht, which had recog-
nized the right of privacy to exclude evidence of a phone conversa-
tion overheard by a private person. The mention, without more, of
the privacy right leaves the impression that the right of privacy is
used as a strawman to allow the court to sidestep the more challeng-
ing task of directly contradicting the United States Supreme
Court's contrary interpretation of the federal search and seizure
provision.
The application of the right of privacy is equally questionable
in the recent decision of State v. Sawyer.' In that case the court
quoted both the right of privacy and the search and seizure provi-
sions stating that an inventory search was "a significant invasion of
individual privacy.""2 The court went on to say that the invasion
would be measured against the reasonableness and the compelling
state interest standards, 3 but carried its analysis only to the point
of adopting a bit of South Dakota decisional law24 "that reasonably
balances the needs of the police . . . with the rights of privacy and
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures held by individu-
als in Montana." 5 The South Dakota decision relies squarely on the
South Dakota search and seizure provision." South Dakota has no
express constitutional right of privacy. The Montana supreme court
engaged in no compelling state interest analysis. Again it appears
that the court has used the right of privacy to shield a disagreement
18. 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d 442 (1972).
19. Id. at 495, 530 P.2d at 446 (1972).
20. 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971).
21. - Mont. -, 571 P.2d 1131 (1977).
22. Id. at , 571 P.2d at 1133.
23. Id. at_, 571 P.2d at 1133-34.
24. State v. Opperman, - S.D. 247 N.W.2d 673, 675 (1976).
25. State v. Sawyer, - Mont. __, __, 571 P.2d 1131, 1134 (1977).
26. State v. Opperman, - S.D. at __, 247 N.W.2d at 675 (1976).
[Vol. 39
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with the United States Supreme Court on fourth amendment law.2 1
More recently, in State v. Charvat, 2 1 the court spoke of privacy,
but again in a search and seizure context. The court applied the
"open fields" doctrine of the United States Supreme Court to the
seizure of marijuana plants drying in the sun behind a building on
an abandoned farm. In upholding the conviction of Charvat for
possession and sale of dangerous drugs, the court quoted language
which interprets the "open fields" doctrine to be an expression of
the fact that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
objects left in open view.29 The court followed the suggested mode
of analysis-that an actual subjective expectation of privacy must
be supported by objective reasonability of the expectation," but
applied the model in a purely fourth amendment context.3'
These cases show that the court, either from an unexpressed
unwillingness or, more likely, from the failure of counsel to properly
raise the privacy guarantee, has not extended the scope of the right
of privacy beyond the context of search and seizure law in the five
years since the adoption of the new constitution. The privacy and
search and seizure provisions address independent rights. The Con-
stitutional Convention Proceedings manifest the intent of the peo-
ple that the right of privacy be broader than, and undiluted by,
fourth amendment rights. The failure of the courts to seek to extend
the scope of the protections offered by the right of privacy has ren-
dered the right a virtual nullity. Practitioners and courts remain
without essential guidance as to what interests are actually pro-
tected by the right of privacy in Montana.
3. Privacy and Other State Courts
Lacking Montana decisions giving any definition to the scope
of the interests protected by the right of privacy, it is natural to turn
to the decisions of the courts of other states which have an explicit
constitutional right of privacy. 2 These decisions not only offer guid-
ance to the courts in how to approach problems of scope, but should
spark the ingenuity of Montana practitioners in using the right of
privacy to defend their clients' interests.
27. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
28. - Mont. -, 573 P.2d 660 (1978).
29. State v. Charvat, - Mont. - -. 573 P.2d 660, 662 (1978), quoting from
United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 1976) cert. denied sub nom., Gangadean
v. United States, 430 U.S. 966 (1977).
30. State v. Charvat, - Mont..... 573 P.2d 660, 663 (1978).
31. Id.
32. For the texts and commentary to the various state constitutional privacy provisions,
see Thomas Towe's excellent primer on the right of privacy, A Growing Awareness of Privacy
in America, 37 MONT. L. Rlv. 39, 43-45 (1976).
19781
5
Gorman: Rights In Collision: The Individual Right Of Privacy And The Public Right To Know
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1978
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
The court and bar of Alaska have been the most active in devel-
oping the right of privacy expressed in their state constitution.
When the Alaska supreme court was first confronted with an as-
serted privacy interest, it immediately adopted a standard for deter-
mining whether a legitimate privacy interest was involved.3 Since
the constitutional provision provided no standard for review, the
court was quick to adopt the compelling state interest test and
explain what burden this places on the state.34 The Alaska court has
set a reach for the absolute protections of the right of privacy,3 as
well as giving fair notice of the areas in which a compelling state
interest is likely to be found .3 As an example of principled and
responsive implementation of a state constitutional standard, the
Alaska supreme court has much to commend its decisions. Of par-
ticular interest to the Montana courts are the scope decisions, 37
which should have persuasive weight when the Montana courts
begin to interpret the right of privacy provision.
For additional guidance, the Montana courts should notice the
constitutional adjudication of other state courts based on readings
of the legislative history of the right to privacy provision. An excel-
lent example was set by the Hawaii supreme court in State v. Roy, 38
where the court made use of the debates and the amendments made
by the delegates in the language of the privacy provision in constru-
ing the scope which the constitutional convention intended the pro-
vision to have. 3' The Illinois supreme court undertook the same
process in Illinois State Employees Association v. Walker,"° where
the division of the court was a clear reflection of the differing views
of the construction to be placed on the actions and recommenda-
tions of the constitutional convention.4' The California supreme
court, lacking a convention history for its right to privacy provision,
used the referendum campaign brochure to aid it in determining the
33. Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086. The court
adopted the standard formulated by Justice Brennan in his concurrence in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967):
1) an actual subjective expectation of privacy, and
2) the expectation is one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
34. Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524, 527 (Alaska 1974). This standard has since been re-
placed by a more flexible one devised by the Alaska supreme court. See Ravin v. State, 537
P.2d 494, 498 (Alaska 1975). Adoption of such a standard is, of course, not open to the
Montana supreme court by the explicit terms of the right of privacy provision.
35. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 500 (Alaska 1975).
36. See L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976); Anderson v. State, 562 P.2d 351
(Alaska 1977).
37. See notes 33 and 35, supra.
38. 54 Haw. 513, 510 P.2d 1066 (1973).
39. Id. at 517, 510 P.2d at 1068-69.
40. 57 Ill.2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974).
41. Id. at 522-24, 531-37, 315 N.E.2d at 15, 20-21.
[Vol. 39
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intent of the people.4" Two states have pursued the avenue of unique
local conditions in helping them to define the expectation of privacy
present in a particular situation. 3 All of these indicate the freedom
of the court to seek guidance in determining the scope of the right
of privacy from the utterances of the people themselves.
Even those states with an express right of privacy in their con-
stitutions have had recourse to the federal case law for guidance,
despite the lack of an express right of privacy in the federal constitu-
tion. Of particular influence have been the definition of privacy as
"the right to be let alone" formulated by Justice Brandeis in his
Olmstead dissent44 and the test for the existence of a protected
privacy interest stated by Justice Brennan in his concurrence in
Katz.45 It is clear, however, that the lack of an express right of
privacy makes the position of the United States Supreme Court on
the scope of the right weak precedent. The majority of the court
refuses to expand the scope of the judicially recognized privacy right
beyond a narrow range of fundamental interests generally limited
to family matters such as procreation." Outside this narrow field the
court has shown an unfortunate tendency to denigrate assertions of
personal privacy interests, even in cases where the issue has not
been thoroughly briefed or argued.47
The Montana courts are not without aid in seeking to deter-
mine the scope of the right of privacy provision of the Montana
Constitution. Materials such as legislative history, tests for a pri-
vacy interest adopted in other state court decisions, and the reason-
ing (if not the self-imposed limits) of the large body of federal pri-
vacy law are all available to guide our judges to a principled exposi-
tion of the right of privacy in Montana.
4. Some Directions
The scope of the right of privacy in Montana is sorely in need
of development. We have had no indication from the Montana su-
preme court since the passage of the new Constitution that the right
is broader than the guarantees of freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures and the warrant requirement. Giving scope to
the right of privacy is, in the first instance, the duty of counsel. It
is imperative that the bar recognize denials of the constitutional
42. White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).
43. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 513 (Alaska 1975) (Boochever, C.J., concurring). The
opposite view is expressed by the Arizona supreme court in State v. Murphy, - Ariz. -,
570 P.2d 1070 (1977).
44. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
45. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
46. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
47. Id. at 715-16, (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1978]
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right of privacy when they arise. It is equally important that the
court devote itself to analysis of what a privacy right is when con-
fronted by a properly raised privacy argument.
Assertion of the right of privacy in its present inchoate state is
limited only by the ingenuity of counsel. Where the state supreme
court has shown a willingness to implement the right, counsel have
placed the right in issue in a broad variety of contexts. One of the
areas where privacy has been asserted with some success has been
in the area of victimless crimes. Certainly the best known state
court decision based on the right-of privacy is Ravin v. State,"5 where
the Alaska supreme court construed the right to protect the posses-
sion and consumption of marijuana in the home. Other state privacy
rights have spurred similar litigation on the use and possession of
marijuana,49 including a challenge now pending in Montana. 0 Other
victimless crime challenges have been made in cases of nude sun-
bathing,5 sexual relations between consenting adults,5" state regu-
lation of wayward youths,5" and possession of cocaine. 4 Clearly,
challenges in Montana in this area are encouraged by the difficulty
of the state in showing a compelling state interest in imposing
moral standards upon its citizens.
Other areas of state action that have been tested under state
constitutions for infringement of protected privacy interests are ex-
pungment of arrest records,55 consent to treatment of the mentally
ill,"e and state conflict of interest laws. 7 Some efforts have been
made to apply the right of privacy to expand common law and
statutory notions of privilege against testimony, 5 though no court
has yet been convinced by such an argument.
The success of privacy arguments in Montana should be en-
hanced by the express requirement that a valid privacy interest can
be overcome only by the showing of a compelling state interest.
Such a standard has not been incorporated in any other explicit
right of privacy provision, and the determinations of some of the
cases from other states, which gave victory to the state on the show-
48. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
49. State v. Kantner, 53 Haw. 327, 493 P.2d 306 (1972); State v. Murphy, - Ariz.
, 570 P.2d 1070 (1977).
50. State v. Zander, District Court of the Fourth Judicial District No. 5169.
51. State v. Rocker, 52 Haw. 336, 475 P.2d 684 (1970).
52. State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1977);
Anderson v. State, 562 P.2d 351 (Alaska 1977).
53. L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976).
54. State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978).
55. St. Louis v. Drolet, - Ill. App.2d -, 348 N.E.2d 289 (1976); Loder v. Municipal
Court, 553 P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1976).
56. Aden v. Younger, 53 Cal. App.3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1976).
57. These cases are discussed in subpart IV of this section, infra.
58. See Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
[Vol. 39
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 39 [1978], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/4
THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION
ing of a rational basis for its action, could not be repeated here.
If we assume that the court adopted a form of analysis in State
v. Charvat,59 (a subjective expectation of privacy that is objectively
reasonable") the process for adjudicating privacy cases in Montana
should follow this format. Counsel would introduce evidence that
his client had an expectation of privacy in a particular action, place,
or document. The court or jury would determine the objective rea-
sonableness of his expectation. If objectively reasonable, the privacy
right could be overcome only by a showing of the part of the state
that it had a compelling interest in abridging the right. It remains
the task of counsel and courts to follow this, or any, thorough
method of analysis to give proper scope to the right of privacy in
Montana.
C. The Right To Know
Article II, section 9 of the Montana Constitution provides:
No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or
to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state
government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which the de-
mand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public
disclosure.
The second right with which this article is concerned is the right
to know. It was elevated to explicit constitutional status in 1972,
long after being recognized in the common law"' and the Montana
statutes. 2 As a right of constitutional status it is unique, though
nearly all the states and the federal government have statutory
enactments. 3 Since its elevation the right to know has generated a
flurry of legislative action designed to implement the right at the
executive and agency levels. This portion of the article will review
the intent of the Constitutional Convention, the legislature's reac-
tions to the constitutional right, and will offer some suggestions for
further legislative and judicial development to bring the right to full
effectiveness in Montana.
1. The Constitutional Convention
The right to know provision and its effect on agency discretion
was the focus of much controversy during the Constitutional Con-
59. State v. Charvat, - Mont. __, 573 P.2d 660 (1978).
60. Id. at -, 573 P.2d 662-63 (1978).
61. See State ex rel. Halloran v. McGrath, 104 Mont. 490, 67 P.2d 838 (1947).
62. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947], §§ 93-1001-
2, 93-1001-4 were originally enacted in 1895. Specific open meeting laws were first enacted in
1963 in R.C.M. 1947, tit. 82, ch. 34.
63. See the complete list (as of 1975) in Note, Freedom of Information in Arizona: An
Antidote for Secrecy in Government, 1975 Aiuz. ST. L. J. 111 (1975).
19781
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vention. The preliminary study prepared for the Bill of Rights Com-
mittee 4 noted that "[t]here is little opportunity at the constitu-
tional level for resolution of these detailed problems of agency dis-
cretion and executive and judicial construction of explicit disclosure
exemptions." 5 The Bill of Rights Committee explained its decision
to recommend constitutional status for the right to know through a
committee member:
The committee approvingly cites section 82-3401 [Open Meetings
Law] . ..but we think that probably it is not enough and that
this provision does go farther and as our government continues to
grow, will provide a better basis than one that is purely statutory."
The Proceedings indicate that the Montana Press Association was
particularly concerned that the right be accorded explicit constitu-
tional status. Representatives of the Association testified before the
Bill of Rights Committee 7 and lobbied heavily, both on the floor
and in the press.18 Their position was that any exception, and specif-
ically the built in exception for the right of privacy, rendered the
provision a right to conceal in the hands of the agencies and other
public bodies.69 The pressure focused on the delegates resulted in
motions to amend the Committee proposal to subject the scope of
the privacy exception to legislative determination,70 or legislative
and judicial determination" to narrow the breadth of interpretation
left open to the agency or public body. The frustration of the dele-
gates with these motions reached its peak when a motion was made
on the floor to delete the provision entirely.7"
The profound distrust of agency discretion expressed by the
Press Association was echoed in the influential comments of Con-
vention President Graybill. His comments favored the original
Committee proposal, and led, without further debate, to the adop-
tion of the original proposal by the Convention. He stated:
[W]e should not force on the legislature the duty of determining
what the rights of the people are in this state. . . .We're giving
up the right of the people to have us determine this matter right
here.
[T]he more language you give the agency to work with, the less
64. Applegate, Montana Constitutional Convention Study No. 10, Bill of Rights (1972).
65. Id. at 116.
66. Proceedings at 5147-48.
67. Proceedings at 5157.
68. Id. See also Proceedings at 7586, 7592, and 7602.
69. Proceedings at 5157.
70. Proceedings at 5170.
71. Proceedings at 7574.
72. Proceedings at 7579.
[Vol. 39
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there's going to be left, because they'll be able to interpret it right
out of the window.
But the way the committee originally drew it, at least the little guy
got something to say to that agency man when he goes to the door.
He's got the Constitution. But he hasn't got anything when we get
done amending it.7"
The provision stayed in the Constitution, but so did the built-in
privacy exception. Whether it will be a tool of concealment remains
to be seen.
2. Legislative Action
The right to know provision did not take the absolute form
desired by the press, but the legislature has been very responsive to
the constitutional mandate, and has implicitly recognized the press
as vindicator of the rights. Section 82-3401 et seq., cited with ap-
proval by the Bill of Rights Committee, were amended in both 1975
and 1977. The original enactment, though in many respects merely
a streamlined federal Freedom of Information Act," was progressive
for 1963, and stated a legislative purpose that the meetings of all
public bodies were assumed to be open. To the general rule there
were, however, a plethora of exceptions, a general one for statutes
which required closed meetings and several specific exceptions for
meetings relating to: (1) national or state security; (2) disciplining
of public officers; (3) employment, promotion, dismissal, etc. of
public officials; (4) purchase of public property or investment of
public funds; (5) revocation of licenses; and (6) law enforcement,
crime prevention, probation and parole.75 This statute did not con-
form to the constitutional right to know, which allows an exception
only "where the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the
merits of public disclosure."
The 1975 amendments reached the most obvious repugnancies
by deleting the general exception and exceptions (1) and (4). The
other exceptions were at least arguably related to individual pri-
vacy, but the format did not reflect the constitutional language or
intent with any clarity.
The 1977 enactment, on the other hand, generally reflects the
constitutional language. The general rule remains that all meetings
are presumed to be open, and provision is made for closing a meet-
ing:
73. Proceedings at 7614-16.
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
75. R.C.M. 1947, § 82-3402 (Supp. 1975).
1978]
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during the time the discussion relates to individual privacy, and
then if, and only if, the presiding officer determines that the de-
mands of individual privacy clearly exceed the merits of public
disclosure .76
Sections were added in 1977 to define meetings broadly to include
conference calls" and provide free access for the press to photo-
graph, record, and televise meetings."' This enactment also includes
a severability clause,"9 and a provision which allows suit in the dis-
trict court to void an agency decision opening or closing a meeting
only if filed within thirty days of the decision. 0
Other legislation in the right to know area has been influenced
by the right to know provision. The Management of Official Records
Act"' places the records made or received by constitutional executive
officers in the keeping of the Montana Historical Society. Access to
these records may be restricted only when "the demand of individ-
ual privacy clearly exceeds the merit of public disclosure. 82 The
decision of the applicability of the privacy exception is made by the
state records committee, not the official .8 The Public Records Man-
agement Act84 creates a system for the efficient management and
preservation of state records in a centralized location. It may also
be assumed that the right to know provision has a greater reach than
the privilege of viewing and copying public documents,8 5 as sug-
gested by the Bill of Rights Committee,8 ' but the legislature has not
yet acted in this area.
3. Some Suggestions
Though the Montana supreme court is cognizant of the right to
know provision, 7 it has not yet been called upon to decide a case
based directly upon an infringement of that right. Two Montana
Attorney General's Opinions have construed the right to know so as
to reconcile confidential records statutes with the constitutional
provision. The Attorney General held that the demands of individ-
ual privacy exceed the merit of public disclosure in the case of
76. R.C.M. 1947, § 82-3402 (Supp. 1977).
77. R.C.M. 1947, § 82-3404 (Supp. 1977).
78. R.C.M. 1947, § 82-3405 (Supp. 1977).
79. Ch. 567, § 6, Laws of Montana 1977.
80. R.C.M. 1947, § 82-3406 (Supp. 1977).
81. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 59-530 to 59-530.4 (Supp. 1977).
82. R.C.M. 1947, § 59-530.4(4) (Supp. 1977).
83. R.C.M. 1947, § 59-530.4(5) (Supp. 1977).
84. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 82-3332 to 3341 (Supp. 1947).
85. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-1001-2, 93-1001-4, 93-1001-5.
86. Committee Comment at 22.
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corporate reports required to be made under the hard rock mining
statutes to the Department of Lands,"8 and in the case of records
submitted by banks to the Department of Revenue as part of the
levy of special assessments on the banks by the Department. 9 In
both cases the Attorney General found support for invoking the
privacy exception in statutes which made disclosure of the records
a felony. If the legislature has indeed made such a judgment, it is
unlikely that the courts would disagree with them on how well the
constitutional intent is served. However, the legislature would do
well to examine these statutory exceptions to determine if the pri-
vacy needs of such "individuals" are indeed compelling.
Another area in which the legislature or the courts could further
the constitutional intent is that of remedies. The lack of procedural
safeguards to obviate or repair violations of the right to know or of
the demands of individual privacy has led to widespread criticism
of many of the public disclosure statutory enactments." A major
focus of the criticism has been the lack of a speedy remedy. Clearly,
when newsworthy information is withheld or material that an indi-
vidual deems private is to be released, time is of the essence to the
party aggrieved. An appeal from agency action that violates the
constitutional right to know should be more immediate than one
afforded under the Montana Administrative Procedure Act.9' No
general statute to accelerate agency or court review of such contro-
versies exists, and it is very questionable whether R.C.M. 1947, §
82-3406 does more than establish a statute of limitations under the
open meetings statutes. Either the courts or the legislature could act
to fill this remedial gap.
A likely judicial remedy is through the injunction statutes. 2
They are designed to afford swift resolution of disputes in which
irreparable injury is threatened. Certainly deprivation of either the
constitutional right to know or the constitutional right of privacy
incorporated in the right to know should be sufficient injury to
trigger the injunction process. The injunction process is swift, as
judicial remedies go, and the agency could be restrained from objec-
tionable action throughout the ensuing litigation.
Should the legislature turn its attention to the problem of swift
resolution of conflicts arising under the right to know provision,
federal experience with litigation arising under its Freedom of Infor-
88. 35 Op. Atty Gen. No. 19 (1973).
89. 35 Op. Atty Gen. No. 59 (1974).
90. See, e.g., Comment, Iowa Open Meetings Act: A Lesson in Legislative
Ineffectiveness, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1108, 1133 (1977); Kalil, Florida Sunshine Law-Is Florida
Sunshine the Most Powerful of Disinfectants?, 49 FLA. B.J. 72, 77-78 (1975).
91. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 82-4201 to 4229 (Supp. 1977).
92. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-4201 to 4216.
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mation Act93 furnishes a valuable model. To resolve disputes involv-
ing the exemptions from disclosure under the act, including that for
disclosure that would be a "clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy,"94 the federal courts developed a workable and accel-
erated procedure for review. The Congress has sanctioned the proce-
dure by enacting it into law. The history of the procedure and its
congressional approval is examined by the United States Supreme
Court in Department of Air Force v. Rose.95 The procedure, as now
embodied in legislation, places jurisdiction of appeals from agency
action in regard to disclosure of records in the district courts." Com-
plaints must be answered by the agency in an abbreviated period
of time. 7 When answered, such appeals are expedited in every way
and accorded preference on the docket. The court hears the ques-
tion de novo, and the records sought and for which an exemption is
claimed are made available to the court for an in camera inspec-
tion.9 Should the court find in favor of the private claimant, it is
authorized to award reasonable costs and attorney's fees against the
United States.'" At the heart of this process is the in camera review
of the disputed material. The federal courts have found that they
can successfully balance competing interests and serve the full dis-
closure intentions of the act through in camera review.1"' The means
adopted by the federal courts and Congress could be easily adapted
to Montana, and could bring the benefits of swift and impartial
resolution to such matters of agency discretion, and public and
private rights.
D. Rights in Collision
The discussion to this point of the right of privacy and the right
to know have intimated that there is, even in the abstract, tension
between the two guarantees. This abstract tension has been recog-
nized and, perhaps, exacerbated by elevating both rights to consti-
tutional status in Montana, and by making them textually interde-
pendent.0 2 This section of the article will discuss a focal point of this
tension in other states with an express right of privacy by detailing
the approaches taken by the states' supreme courts in balancing the
93. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
94. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976).
95. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
96. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
97. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(C) (1976).
98. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(D) (1976).
99. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
100. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976).
101. Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
102. MONT. CONST., art. HI, § 9.
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conflicting rights of individuals and of society. It also offers a rudi-
mentary procedure for reaching a principled resolution of conflicts
as they arise in Montana.
1. When Rights Collide
To date, the prime arena for the collision of the right of privacy
and the right to know is public officials' conflicts of interest laws.
The right of privacy and standards for the quality of service per-
formed by elected representatives have come to the forefront of
public attention at about the same time, partly in response to grave
abuses of each in the last decade. The reactions of legislatures in
various states to public concern for whether elected officials are
truly serving the public interest has characteristically taken the
form of laws requiring the elected officials, or candidates for office,
to disclose their financial holdings and dealings.' The controversy
about these laws has revolved around the limits the right of privacy
places on the legislatively imposed duty to reveal.
The fountainhead of this litigation is the decision of the Su-
preme Court of California in City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young. 0 4
The court recognized that the public's right to know about possible
conflicts of interest "is a laudable and proper legislative concern
and interest."'0 5 But, it reasoned that public employment does not
waive the employee's constitutional rights. The court extended this
reasoning, stating that:
[I]n the present case there must be a balancing of interests be-
tween the government's need to expose or minimize possible con-
flicts on one hand and the right to maintain privacy in one's per-
sonal financial affairs while seeking or holding public office on the
other.'"
Employing this balancing test, the court found the enactment un-
constitutional because it indiscriminately failed to relate the disclo-
sure provisions to the areas of possible conflicts of interest.07 The
court found that the means chosen by the legislature in attempting
to achieve its proper purpose, because they entailed the stifling of
a fundamental interest, must be narrowly drawn to serve the pur-
pose, absent a showing of overriding necessity. 08 Justice Mosk dis-
sented. He considered the invasion of privacy under the statute an
103. Montana law makes campaign contribution disclosure voluntary. See R.C.M.
1947, § 59-1710 (Supp. 1977).
104. 2 Cal.3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
105. Id., 466 P.2d at 226-27.
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insignificantly greater intrusion into the privacy of personal fi-
nances than zoning regulations and income taxes,'"9 both of which
are unquestionably constitutional. Alternatively, he felt that the
right of privacy was properly overridden by the right to know when
an individual assumed public office."10
The California legislature responded by narrowing the disclo-
sure requirements to those directly related to the office, and when
the revised law was challenged in County of Nevada v.
MacMillen, '" it was upheld. The court reaffirmed the need for bal-
ancing of interests, stating "neither the right to privacy, nor the
right to seek and hold public office, must inevitably prevail over the
right of the public to an honest and impartial government. ' '"1 2
When the Illinois supreme court faced the same issue in Stein
v. Howlett, ,,3 it recognized the right of privacy, but decided that the
state had a compelling interest in eliminating conflicts of interest
and instilling public trust in elected officials paramount to the right
of the individual, and held that the legislative means selected was
not an overbroad invasion of the constitutional privacy right.", The
court distinguished Carmel on the basis of an Illinois constitutional
provision requiring a statement of economic interests of officehold-
ers at the state level. When Illinois public employees challenged an
executive order requiring them to make financial disclosures"5 the
court found occasion to take a long, if unsympathetic, look at the
state constitutional right of privacy. Referring to the legislative his-
tory of the constitutional provision, the court found, by implication,
that the convention had rejected the contention that financial dis-
closure violated the right of privacy,"' and stated that "[niot all
members of this court are convinced that this provision should be
interpreted as asserting anything beyond protection from invasions
of privacy by eavesdropping or other means of interception."" 7 Ac-
cordingly, the court rejected the challenge to the executive order.
Justice Ryan dissented, emphasizing a contrary interpretation of
the convention's intent with regard to the protection afforded by the
right of privacy to personal financial affairs."18 His approach and
conclusion mirror those of the majority in Carmel.
109. Id., 466 P.2d at 241-42.
110. Id., 466 P.2d at 243.
111. 11 Cal.3d 662, 522 P.2d 1345, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1974).
112. Id. at 672, 522 P.2d at 1351, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
113. 52 Ill.2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 402, appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 925 (1972).
114. Id. at 578, 289 N.E.2d at 413.
115. Illinois State Employees Association v. Walker, 57 Ill.2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974).
116. Id.. at.524, 315 N.E.2d at 15.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 531-37, 315 N.E.2d at 20-21.
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The Washington supreme court has also ruled on a privacy
challenge to a state conflict of interest law."' Its initial finding was
that the state had a compelling interest in guaranteeing that public
officials would not be influenced by conflicts of interest.20 The
phrasing of its constitutional privacy standard in terms of "private
affairs" buttressed its conclusion that those who choose public serv-
ice have minimal expectations of such privacy. Also, the court found
that the statutory approach, requiring only general categories of
holdings rather than specific interests and amounts, was suited to
the legislative ends. In upholding the statute, the court noted that
the disclosure requirements were burdensome, but asserted that the
public's right to know clearly exceeded the weight of all asserted
invasions of private rights.'
Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices Commission' challenged the
financial disclosure portions of the statute not as an invasion of the
privacy of the official, but as an invasion of the privacy rights of his
patients. The official was a physician a part of whose practice was
legal abortions. The court recognized that he was the only person
in a position to assert the privacy rights of his patients, whose names
and transactions with him would be revealed. 1 3 Finding that the
requisite level of governmental justification for impinging on the
individual right of privacy, particularly in the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, was necessarily very high,2 4 the court warned that the
means chosen by the legislature could constitute a very serious inva-
sion, despite the proper purpose. The court avoided invalidating the
law, and instructed the commission, which had authority under the
legislation to develop guidelines for implementation, to promulgate
regulations to protect the suggested privacy interests.2 5 The court
enjoined enforcement of the law until the commission carried out
this task.
These courts generally balanced the competing rights involved
in favor of the public right to know. The right of privacy could be
characterized as being of relatively little weight in such cases, while
the right to know is comparatively greater, generally being charac-
terized as a compelling state interest, despite its lack of constitu-
tional status. Where the rights have collided, it has been the indi-
vidual who has been forced to yield to society's greater need. The
119. Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash.2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974).
120. Id. at 294, 517 P.2d at 923.
121. Id. at 301, 517 P.2d at 925.
122. 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977).
123. Id. at 475.
124. Id. at 476.
125. Id. at 480.
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inquiry remains whether such a result could or should obtain in
Montana.
2. If Rights Collide-Montana's Balance
As noted, the Montana supreme court has yet to construe the
constitutional right of privacy outside the fourth amendment area.
Nor has the court directly construed the right to know. Though the
two rights are in natural and daily conflict at the agency level, there
is no legislative history outside the language of the provisions them-
selves to aid in clarifying where the balance between the rights is
to be struck. The key problem involved in balancing the rights is
effectuating the beneficial policy of open government without un-
necessarily denigrating the individual right of privacy.
Much of the current uncertainty stems from the general lack of
guidance as to the scope of a legitimate privacy interest. The weight
of the privacy right is clear from the terms of the constitutional
provision-it is paramount to all but compelling interests of the
state. The right to know textually incorporates the right of privacy.
This suggests that where the interest of the public in disclosure is
less than compelling, the right of privacy is to be accorded a greater
weight. The right to know presents no problems of scope. It clearly
embraces all documents and deliberations of state government at all
levels. The variable which remains is the scope of the right of pri-
vacy.
In seeking to reconcile the right of privacy and the right to
know, the starting point for analysis should be whether there is a
valid privacy right involved. That is, what is protected? The Mon-
tana supreme court has intimated in State v. Charvat"I that it
approves of the test enunciated by Justice Harlan in his concurrence
in Katz v. United States.'27 General application of this two step
inquiry, whether there was a subjective expectation of privacy and
whether society recognizes the expectation as objectively reasona-
ble, would be very conducive to eliminating the scope problems
inherent in our right of privacy. A court faced with reconciling the
right of privacy and the right to know could follow much the same
method suggested for principled adjudication of privacy interests in
the subpart on the right of privacy, supra. After determining that a
valid privacy interest exists, the court would determine whether the
public's right to know constitutes a compelling state interest within
the context of the case. Should the court find that it does, the court
would then determine whether that compelling interest is clearly
126. _ .Mont. -, 573 P.2d 660 (1978).
127. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
[Vol. 39
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 39 [1978], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol39/iss2/4
THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION
exceeded by the demands of individual privacy involved.
No matter what the result, the court would, at the very least,
be making a useful initial determination of the scope of the right of
privacy. Each successive step necessary to the court's determination
would further illuminate the ways and instances in which the rights
balance each other. By employing such a method, the court could
uphold a public right to know in a manner that does not avoid, and
thus denigrate, the scope and weight to be accorded the right of
privacy.
E. Conclusion
It is now perceivable that this article focuses on a task of great
importance which lies before the courts. It shows that the Constitu-
tional Convention left the development of the scope of the right of
privacy to the courts. It shows how a competing right, the right to
know, is textually dependent on the determination of the scope of
the privacy right. And it shows that, lacking the efforts of court and
counsel, the lack of an effective method for defining the scope of the
privacy right and balancing it against an asserted public right to
know could result in the crippling of the right of privacy when the
rights collide. Above all, it points out a method, and a need to take
these new constitutional rights, public and private, seriously.
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